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Mr. Watt, members of the Institute: 
For almost 60 years, Chatham House has been a stimulus and a guide for the 
creativity of western societies. I welcome this opportunity to share with 
you some thoughts on how the partnership between Europe and the United 
States - the cornerstone of our western heritage - can respond creatively 
and effectively to the challenge of the times in which we live. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
More than three decades ago the United States and the nations of 
Western Europe joined together to rebuild a devastated continent and to 
create a military alliance to protect freedom. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, those who fashioned the Marshall Plan 
and worked to create NATO possessed a vision of a strong America and a 
strong Europe bound by common interests. From this vision, they created a 
self-renewing partnership that derives continuing vitality from the values 
and hopes that we share. 
We have passed through a particularly difficult period during the 
1970's. But we have navigated these turbulent waters. Although the course 
ahead remains demanding, the progress we have made should give us great 
confidence in our future. 
For the first time in its history, all members of the NATO 
alliance are democracies. 
NATO is strong and growing stronger. 
We have not only resisted the worst protectionist pressures 
in a generation; we are working together to shape a healthier 
and more open world trading system. 
We have established a pat~ern ofclaser consultation on economic 
and security matters than at any point in recent history. 
European integration is proceeding, confirming our belief that 
a strong Europe is good for a strong America. 
And we are moving toward more normal relations with the nations 
of Eastern Europe. Progress toward this goal has reflected our 
support for full implementation of the Helsinki final act and 
recognition of the sovereignty and independence of the nations 
of this area. 
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Today, I want to discuss with you how, building on this solid 
foundation, we can continue to assure our mutual security and foster a 
healthy resurgence of our economies. These are the most pressing items on 
our common agenda. 
But even as we concentrate on these vital concerns, which have been 
the constant threads of our partnership, our common interests compel us to 
address together a broadened international agenda. For there are longer-
term challenges to our security and well-being that also demand serious and 
sustained attention: , 
How will the International Economic System, as well as our own 
economies, adapt to changing patterns of international trade 
and commerce? 
How can we meet increasing energy needs without heightening 
the risk of nuclear proliferation? 
How can we help meet the legitimate security needs of nations 
while seeking agreed limitations on the growth of conventional 
arms sales? 
And how can we find the political will to·act now on issues which 
will have a profound impact on the world we leave our children, 
issues such as population growth and environmental protection? 
These issues will tax our creativity and persistence to the fullest. 
For we approach all of these issues in a changing and pluralistic 
international system, with over 150 independent nations and emerging·new 
power centers. No single nation, or group of nations, can dictate solutions 
to these complex problems. They are truly international, in their origins 
and in the necessary scope of their solutions. Increasingly, our leadership 
must therefore take the form of inspiring other nations to work with us 
toward goals we share and can best achieve in concert. And on each of these 
issues, we look to our European allies as a core around which we must build 
these cooperative efforts. 
Our ability to address this broader. agenda will depend on the essential 
vitality of our partnership 
military strength. 
and specifically on our economic and 
2. ECONOMIC SECURITY FOR OUR PEOPLES 
For most of our countries, the most pressing demand today is to 
revitalize our economies and to restore a sense of confidence in our 
economic system. 
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When the economic history of the last five years is written, two 
important trends will stand out. 
The United States and Europe, and indeed the industrialized democracies 
as a Whole, have experienced the most severe economic problems of the last 
quarter century. These included sharp increases in world oil prices and 
inflation, followed by a serious recession and high unemployment. 
Yet despite these serious problems, we have been successful in 
strengthening our economic and political cooperation. Instead of sliding 
back into beggar-thy-neighbour psychology that destroyed the global economy 
in the 1930's, we have created new and more effective mechanisms for serious, 
concerted actions. The institution of periodic summit meetings on economic 
matters, closer collaboration among monetary authorities, the creation of the 
International Energy Agency and a more active OECD - all these efforts 
reflect confidence in our capacities, not despair in the face of difficulties. 
We are increasing our economic coordination with one another for a 
simple reason: because we all now understand that the economic health of 
each of us is important to the economic health of us all. This is especially 
true in times of economic difficulty. Pressures increase to protect 
domestic markets, competition sharpens, and we are all tempted to resolve 
our individual problems at the expense of our neighbours. But it is 
precisely then that we must be particularly sensitive to the impact our 
decisions at home will have on others abroad. If we make those decisions 
without sufficient regard for the problems of others, we only invite 
retaliation and a spiral of compensating actions. All of us will lose 
ground: all of us will be worse off. 
As a result, we all have clearly recognized that only through the 
development of a common strategy, to which each country contributes, can 
we enhance the well-being of every nation. 
Cooperating in this way can be difficult and frustrating. Domestic 
political support for tough economic decisions often comes slowly in 
democracies. In some cases, results fall short of our expectations and 
we must redouble our efforts. But actions by each of us, together with 
greater transatlantic cooperation, have placed the United States and other 
~ industrialized nations on the path to sustained, non-inflationary growth. 
Success will enhance our ability to expand individual opportunity and social 
justice, which are the greatest strengths of our democracies. 
A. THE U.S. ECONOMY 
The United States fully recognizes the importance of a strong and vital 
American economy to building greater economic security for Europe, Japan and 
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other nations of the world. What we do in Washington can affect the lives 
of citizens of London or Rome, just as the decisions of other governments 
affect the well-being of Americans. 
Accordingly, the domestic economic policies of the United States are 
fashioned with a view toward the economic interests of the Atlantic 
community as a whole. Fundamental to this effort are the commitments made 
by President Carter at the Bonn summit last July. He pledged the United 
States to a major effort to reduce inflation and to an energy policy which 
significantly reduces u.s. oil imports. We are taking specific actions to 
fulfill these commitments: 
On October 24, President Carter announced a broad-based programme 
to fight inflation. It includes monetary restraint, sharp 
reductions in governmental spending, and explicit standards for 
wage and price increases. The President's new budget will put 
a very tight lid on public expenditures and reduce our federal 
deficit to less than half that of 1976. 
The President has stressed that controlling inflation is our 
overriding domestic priority. We will persist until we have 
achieved that objective. 
On November 1, we undertook further far-reaching actions to 
reinforce the anti-inflation effort and strengthen the dollar. 
We have tightened monetary conditions significantly. The 
United States also joined with the three major surplus countries -
Germany, Japan and Switzerland - in coordinating direct inter-
vention in the foreign exchange market to correct the excessive 
decline of the dollar. We will continue to cooperate in a 
forceful and coordinated way to assure stability in exchange 
markets. To finance its share, the u.s. is mobilizing an 
unprecedented 30 billion (30,000 million) dollars which will be 
used~ together with resources of the other countries, to 
intervene massively if necessary to achieve our objectives. The 
u.s. has also expanded its gold sales programme. 
We expect that with the fundamental improvements in the u.s. 
economic position now underway, these actions will exert a 
continuing positive effect on the dollar. 
On November 9, the President signed legislation which lays the 
basis for a sounder U.S. energy policy. This legislation should 
result in oil import savings of roughly 2.5 million barrels per 
day by 1985. We are already improving our energy situation. 
U.S. energy prices have risen significantly close to world levels. 
- 6 - PE 56.809 
( 
And growth in energy consumption is now running well below 
growth in our GNP. 
We are also working to reduce our balance of payments deficit 
through a more vigorous export promotion programme. 
President Carter is determined to build political support for serious 
actions to deal with our economic problems. That support is growing. 
Neither the President, Congress nor the American people will be satisfied 
until we show marked progress in fighting inflation, strengthening the 
dollar, and creating a sound energy economy. 
B. U.S. - EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
While the first task for each of us is to put our domestic house in 
order, we must at the same time undertake those joint efforts that are 
needed to sustain our economic growth. 
There is no more immediate or more crucial test of our ability to 
join together for our common gain than the successful completion - this 
month - of the multilateral trade negotiations. 
During the last three decades, we have worked together to build a more 
open and better functioning world trading system. Now we have an opportunity 
to consolidate the progress we have made and further improve the structure 
of our trading relationships. In so doing, we can construct for the future 
a trading environment with greater certainty and confidence - one which 
will foster the continued expansion of world commerce. If we succeed, 
there will be economic gains for us all. If we fail, we will jeopardize 
the economic progress we have made. Failure would fuel our inflation, slow 
our growth, and make it more difficult for developing nations to play a 
full part in the world trading system. And if we fail, we will have also 
jeopardized the political cooperation that we have painstakingly achieved. 
A major objective of the trade negotiations is to provide for an agreed 
framework to govern subsidies and countervailing duties. When our congress 
convenes next month, the President will seek legislation to extend the 
. authority to waive countervailing duties to cover the period needed to 
implement the Tokyo round agreements. And we will take measures to 
minimize the disruptive effects that could flow from expiration of the 
waivers on January 3. 
Our negotiators in Geneva will strive to conclude their talks this 
month. But even as we gain ground toward a more open and better operating 
trading system, we must avoid piecemeal retreats toward protectionism which 
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could undermine that progress. In each country, various groups will 
continue to ask Governments to intervene in the trading system for economic, 
political and social reasons. Our countries have recognized the importance 
of resisting demands which impede effective economic adjustment to change. 
Our response to such demands must be within the context of the trading 
framework we have designed together. Our policies must facilitate positive 
adjustment of our economies to changing economic conditions, rather than 
hindering such adjustment or shifting the burden onto others. 
C. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
Beyond the immediate need to strengthen the world trading system, we 
all have a basic interest in promoting the emerging role of the European 
Community in international economic affairs. In the United States, we 
admire the vision of men and women who are working to broaden and deepen 
cooperation among the nations of Europe. We welcome and support this 
development, for a strong European Community is in America's interest as 
well as in the interests of all European nations: it provides a dynamic 
new force in international economic and political relations. 
The new European monetary arrangements for close monetary cooperation 
within the European Community, announced on December 5, represent an 
important step toward the economic integration of Europe we have lon~ 
supported. We believe that the new arrangements will be implemented in a 
way which will contribute to sustainable growth in the world economy· and a 
stable international monetary system. The United States looks forward to 
continued close consultations with its European trading partners as these 
arrangements evolve. 
In general, the next few years will be critical ones for Europe, as the 
Community works toward close economic integration, expands its membership, 
holds its first direct elections to the European Parliament, and assumes a 
growing responsibility for the political and economic well-being of Europe 
as a whole. 
All the western democracies share in support and concern for the 
democracies in Southern Europe. We in the United States respect the 
political commitment of Community leaders to open its membership to these 
states and to deal with the economic problems that will come with such a 
step. 
As prospering western democracies, we should recognize a special 
responsibility to those democracies in the region threatened by a faltering 
economy - where the short term prospects are bleak but where, with a 
helping hand, economies can be put on a sound footing and the long term 
prospects can be bright. There are established mechanisms to provide needed 
assistance - the IMF and the World Bank. Some situations may also call for 
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complementary informal or ad hoc arrangements. The consortium for Portugal 
is an example. Those nations in a position to help should concert their 
energies and resources. Supportive action before it is too late is an 
investment in the future of freedom. 
D. U.S. - EUROPEAN RELATIONS AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
As we consider means to strengthen the economic bonds among the 
developed countries, we must recognize that our interests - and our 
responsibilities - do not end there. Meeting the desire of our citizens 
for economic security and a rising standard of living requires us to respond 
more fully to the a~pirations of peoples in developing nations. 
Increasingly, their economic well-being is indispensable to our own. 
Together, the world's developing countries account for roughly one-
third of total trade for the OECD nations. These countries provide the 
most rapidly-expanding markets for exports of the industrial world -
markets on which millions of jobs in our nations depend. Developing 
countries provide us with critical raw materials. And we need their 
cooperation to solve such critical global problems as energy and food. 
In short, we cannot build a strong international economic system 
without steady economic progress by the developing nations. 
Together, we must attempt to push aside the ideological debates which 
often have characterized the relationship between the developing and 
industrial nations. We must seek practical and concrete measures to address 
the basic needs of roughly 800 million people who live in absolute poverty. 
There is no more important challenge to the world's long-term well-
being, to our political security and to our essential values as free peoples 
than working together with the developing nations to foster their economic 
progress. 
3. SECURITY ISSUES 
The cornerstone of our prosperity is the confidence we have in our . 
security. This security depends essentially on maintaining strong military 
forces; on managing effectively the West's relations with the Soviet Union; 
on seeking to limit and reduce arms in both East and West; and on the 
strength of the Atlantic partnership. 
We can find cause for concern in the continuing increases in Soviet 
military prog~ammes and deployments. But we ·can also find cause for 
confidence in the steps we in the alliance are taking to preserve the 
military balance. 
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For some years now, the central fact of world security has been 
strategic nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
We and our partners have managed this situation without allowing either our 
deterrent or our will to be ordered. 
The fact of strategic parity remains. Just as we will match Soviet 
increases, so we must assume that the Soviets are resolved to match us. 
Thus, the pursuit of superiority by either side would result in frustration, 
waste, increased tension and - in the end - reduced security for all. 
Our common security rests on three underlying principles. 
First, just as we must remain alert and resolute about Soviet Union 
actions, so·we must also be ready to explore and expand areas of mutual 
interest. To allow our fears to obscure our need to seek common ground is 
to condemn ourselves to unrelenting tension. But neither can we let our 
desire for better relations lead us· into arrangements that will not 
adequately protect our national interests. 
Second, we must be prepared to do what is necessary to assure our 
security, while preferring to maintain a balance at lower levels of 
armaments. Both the military and arms control paths have figured centrally 
in the history of NATO's pursuit of security. 
Arms control is complicated and frustrating. Our goals and our efforts 
will inevitably be criticized - by some who believe there is too little 
disarmament, and by others Who believe the Soviets are taking advantage of 
arms control agreements. Let us be clear and realistic about what we are 
seeking to accomplish. Arms control cannot put an end to military 
competition. But we can - and do - use arms control to cap arms build-ups, 
to begin the difficult process of reductions and qualitative restraints and 
to sustain a needed dialogue. 
Arms control, correctly understood and wisely applied, is yet another 
way - a complementary way - to pursue security. We should not let our 
inability to.accomplish everything immediately discourage us from significant 
steps we can achieve. 
Third, while the United States will remain unsurpassed in military 
strength, we all must remain constantly aware that our security requires 
collective allied effort, and that our defense is indivisible. As an 
alliance, we share in the burdens and risks of a common defense. Western 
strength - in a military sense, and also in a larger sense - depends upon 
the health of our partnership and in our self-confidence about the future. 
These fundamental principles guide our security decisions. A look at 
the actual military situation and trends, and at how the United States and 
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its allies manage the condition of strategic parity, shows that we face 
great challenges - and we are meeting them through cooperative action. 
u.s. strategic modernization plans span the land, sea, and air 
components of our forces. We are developing a new ICBM, and options for 
new ICBM basing are under intensive review to allow us to choose the best 
among the various alternatives. We will begin deploying a new submarine-
based missile next year, and we are building a new strategic submarine. 
We have a vigorous long-range ctuise missile programme underway, including 
not only the air-launched version but sea and ground-launched versions as 
well. These programmes will ensure that the alliance's strength will 
continue to be sufficient to deter attack and protect our common interests. 
SALT is another instrument for bolstering security. 
SALT I and the ABM Treaty began the important process of limiting 
strategic arms. Without these agreements, we would have been launched into 
a defensive arms race on top of an unlimited race in offensive arms. 
SALT II will be a major brake on the momentum of strategic arms 
competition. Facing a more regulated and predictable future, we will be 
able to devote more of our attention, talent and resources to improving 
conventional and theater nuclear forces for NATO. 
SALT II will establish the principle of equality in the number of 
strategic delivery vehicles. 
And it will put a limit on the number of MIRV'D ICBM'S -which are 
potentially most harmful to stability. 
At the same time, SALT II will not rule out the force programmes we 
have underway to meet the challenges that will remain even with an 
agreement. We have preserved all our major strategic force options. 
Other programmes that can strengthen deterrence in NATO can go forward. 
Allied interests have been protected, because allied interests are our 
interests. 
Let me emphasize that in both our defense efforts and our arms control 
negotiations, our·basic aim is to strengthen the security of the United 
States and that of our allies. This has been and will always be the 
fundamental touchstone of our policy. 
That is why we are involved in SALT - because a sound agreement will 
improve western and global security. Without an agreement, our technological 
and economic strength would enable us to match· any Soviet strategic build-up. 
But a good agreement can provide more security with lower risk and cost. And 
we recognize that without SALT the strategic competition could infect the 
entire East-West political relationship, damaging the effort to create a 
less dangerous world which is at the heart of western foreign policies. 
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The emerging SALT II agreement will not solve all our problems. It 
will not, for example, reverse the trend toward increased vulnerability of 
fixed, land-based missiles, a problem in the long run for both sides. 
Necessary strategic force modernization must and will move forward, just as 
the SALT process must and will move forward. In SALT III we will work for 
further reductions and qualitative limits. 
We cannot discuss the management of strategic parity without coming to 
grips with the issue of how NATO should respond to Soviet improvements in 
their nuclear forces targetted against Europe. Though the linkage to 
American strategic forces remain NATO's ultimate deterrent, the Soviets 
must understand that we will not let a weakness develop at any point along 
the continuum of our deterrent, including theater nuclear forces. We have 
several theater nuclear modernization programmes in process. We are 
exploring whether arms control efforts could be of.benefit. Although no 
decisions have been reached regarding force requirements or arms control, we 
are consulting intensively within the alliance to fashion a common plan. 
At the conventional level, improvements in Soviet forces continue. 
Here too the west is responding effectively. The May 1978 summit meeting 
in Washington agreed to a long-term defense programme designed to improve 
the ab~~ity of NATO to function as a defense coalition. NATO is placing 
top priority on improving conventional forces. In the last few years, the 
Vnited States has increased its forces in Europe by roughly ten thousand. 
NATO is broadly engaged in a determined effort to increase readiness and 
capabilities for sustained defense. Wisely, we are emphasizing improvements 
~hich draw upon our collective technological strength, and which will ~sult 
in greater effectiveness rather than simply larger forces. Many of these 
' 
steps are not glamorous; they do not attract headlines. But they are serious 
steps taken by a serious alliance, resolved to muster the resources and 
will to build a better commondefense. 
Here, too, we are striving to negoti~te restraints based on parity. 
1978 has brought movement by both sides in the 5-year old MBFR negotiations. 
Difficult problems remain. But gaining Soviet agreement to reduce forces to 
equal collective levels is worth a further sustained effort. Let us hope 
. that the achievement of a Strategic Arms Limitations Agreement can impart a 
new momentum to the MBFR negotiations. 
Of course, western sec~rity concerns and interests are wider tha~NATO. 
We must also ask whether, in an age of strategic parity, we are at a 
disadvantage in competing with the Soviet Union in the Third World. The 
answer is NO. While Soviet capabilities for projecting military power have 
improved, the United States retains not only unequalled naval forces and 
other forms of military power but also enjoys economic and political 
advantages. 
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We also welcome the growing spirit of national independence in the 
developing nations. They have demonstrated, time and again, their determi-
nation and ability to avoid domination by any outside powers. 
Since 1960, the decolonization process, now nearly complete, has 
produced some 65 new nations, with widely differing political, economic 
and social systems. During these years, outside influence has waxed and 
waned in different countries and at different times. There have not been 
the permanent communist advances many once feared. 
This diversity, and the irrepressible thirst for national freedom 
among the Third World nations, are the surest barriers to foreign domination. 
We can best promote our own interests in these areas of the world by welcoming 
this diversity and respecting this spirit. 
The economic, political, cultural and security ties between the West 
and the Third World have supported this spirit of independence. We must 
strengthen those ties - by continuing to support the economic development 
and, when necessary, the military security of these nations through our 
assistance; by pressing the Soviets and their allies to exercise 
restraint in troubled areas; and by working to resolve diplomatically 
those disputes which offer opportunities for foreign interference. 
In the long run, it is the ability of the West to offer practical_ 
support to Third World nationalism, self-determination and economic growth 
that should make us very confident about our future relations. 
CONCLUSION 
In each of the areas I have addressed today, whethareconomic, political 
or military, one finds extraordinary challenges... But together, America 
and Europe have extraordinary resources with which to meet them. 
The physical, industrial and technological resources of our alliance 
are unequaled. If we have the will to develop our economies with equity 
and maintain our defenses with determination, we can achieve a safer and 
more stable world. And we have that will. 
In the end, our alliance is held together not simply by what we axe 
against, but by what we are for. Our greatest strengths are the ties that 
bind us together. 
These ties are founded on a vision of the rights and dignity of the 
individual, on political justice and freedom for all people. 
The negotiations in which we are engaged, and the policies we pursue, 
lack meaning unless our foreign policies are in accord with these basic 
values of our peoples. 
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Winston Churchill spoke once of the need to pull together and 
"firmly grasp the larger hopes of humanity". 
His charge remains, today, our challenge. 
++++ 
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